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ABSTRACT 
This paper investigates the attribution of responsibility to 
artificial intelligent systems. It argues that traditional 
approaches to the subject are insufficient because they 
encounter some of the same problems that one encounters 
when attributing responsibility to humans. Peter 
Strawson's take on responsibility is introduced as an 
alternative approach. He claims that theoretical 
considerations miss the point when we ponder the 
responsibility of human agents. Instead, we should 
understand responsibility as part of the practice of human 
life. This claim is investigated and transferred to AI to see 
if it provides a more fruitful way to understand 
responsibility of artificial intelligent systems.  
Keywords 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INTRODUCTION  
As artificial intelligent systems (AI, in this paper also 
used for the singular) become more and more advanced, 
questions about responsibility arise. For example, who is 
responsible when AI cause an accident? AI, such as 
drones and driverless cars, are considered learning (i.e. 
semi-autonomous) automata and are thus not merely tools 
in the hands of human agents, fully controlled by the 
operator  [Matthias, 2004]. As AI become part of our 
human world more and more and potential harm issuing 
from their actions is no longer a theme for science-fiction 
writers, we should think about who (or what?) to blame 
when things go wrong. This paper will look into what the 
traditional way of thinking about responsibility and AI 
amounts to, why it does not succeed in ascribing 
responsibility to AI and whether Peter Strawson’s 
approach to humans as members of a moral community is 
worth further investigation in relation to AI. 
INDEPENDENT CONDITION THEORIES 
The most common way responsibility is attributed to 
humans, which I will call independent conditions theories 
(IC theories), will be investigated first. 
Conditions  
IC theories expect that you have to fulfill certain 
conditions in order to be responsible. These three 
conditions are 1) autonomy, 2) having reasonable 
alternatives and 3) being causally relevant. 1) Autonomy 
is commonly held to be the condition of being able to 
intentionally develop reasons and act upon those reasons. 
It sometimes gets discussed when we are concerned with 
developing children and the sanity of grown-ups. 
2) Whether someone had reasonable alternatives for his 
actions depends on the definition of reasonableness. This 
definition sometimes gets discussed in real life when 
trying to discern between temptation and compulsion. 
3) Whether one’s action is causally relevant to some event 
becomes interesting when discussing global causal 
connections, such as one’s contribution to global 
warming.  An example an IC theory will be sketched first 
before turning to the applicability to AI.  
Example IC theory 
Braham and Van Hees (2012) think that the three 
conditions are independently necessary conditions, 
meaning that each is a necessary but not sufficient reason 
to assign moral responsibility:  
• Agency Condition (AC). The person is an autonomous 
agent who performed his or her action intentionally.  
• Causal Relevancy Condition (CRC). There should be a 
causal relation between the action of the agent and the 
resultant state of affairs 
• Avoidance Opportunity Condition (AOC). The agent 
should have had a reasonable opportunity to have done 
otherwise. 
It will be argued that it cannot be ascertained whether 
such conditions apply to AI.   
IC theories applied to AI 
When applying IC theories to AI it needs to be checked if 
we can verify all three conditions. In this summarized 
paper I will only describe the Agency Condition (AC), 
although similar arguments can be developed against the 
Avoidance Opportunity Condition (AOC). 
Agency Condition 
An AI or human satisfies this condition if it performed the 
act autonomously. This means that the AI or human has to 
be aware of what it is doing and what the consequences 
of doing so will be, and that it has some reasons to do 
what it does. Moreover, it has to be the uncaused source 
of its own considerations. How can we tell in the case of 
an AI? Does an AI which acts as if it knows what it is 
doing and which gives reasons for what it is doing really 
know and really have its own reasons? In the lively 
debate between strong and weak AI such questions are 
crucial. Proponents of AI as truly intelligent systems, 
such as Dennett, claim that acting as if it is reasonable is 
reason enough to attribute autonomous reasonableness to 
a system, opponents, e.g. Searle and Chalmers, claim that 
such acting is nothing but a hollow shell, an imitation of 
true reasonableness lacking some vital ingredient to be 
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rightfully called reasonable. The problem goes deeper: 
when trying to figure out why humans act the way they 
do we are confronted by the puzzling fact that we cannot 
tell whether humans are autonomous, because we cannot 
tell whether their acts are initiated by themselves or 
initiated by other factors. In other words, causal 
determinism might be true. The thesis of causal 
determinism claims that all of physical reality, including 
humans, is governed by laws of cause and effect and 
therefore we cannot tell for sure whether a human can be 
held responsible. There is as yet no clear solution to this 
problem. As long as this stays unanswered we do not 
know whether an AI (or human) meets the AC. 
The IC theories way of thinking about responsibility is 
thus not sufficient when reasoning about responsibility 
and AI because 1) it cannot be ascertained whether an AI 
or human meets the AC and 2) all the conditions need to 
be met for ascribing responsibility. 
Are we then left empty-handed? Do we have to develop a 
firm understanding of what it means to apply theoretical 
concepts to human actions before we can decide on the 
applicability of responsibility to AI? Is a situation in 
which we hesitate to attribute responsibility to human 
agents the key? Should we withhold judgement until the 
conceptual problems are resolved, or should we look at 
situations in which we intuitively know when an agent is 
to be held responsible? It is clear from these findings that 
we need to consider new approaches for thinking about 
assigning responsibility to AI because as long as we 
cannot fully understand what `acting intentionally’ (AC) 
or for that matter what `having a reasonable opportunity 
to do otherwise’ (AOC) mean, responsibility cannot be 
attributed to AI. Peter Strawson developed such a new 
approach. 
STRAWSON ON RESPONSIBILITY  
In Freedom and Resentment Strawson (2008) 
demonstrates that moral responsibility is not determined 
by external, that is, detached, considerations, arguments 
and theories like IC theories, but by practices that are an 
internal part of any moral community. These practices are 
simply a given and natural part of participation in human 
society. Therefore the threats of causal determinism (his 
main challenge in Freedom and Resentment) to the 
theoretical concepts of autonomy, intentionality and free 
will become irrelevant. Strawson uses the psychological 
facts of human nature to argue for the validity of 
assigning blame or praise to agents. In normal 
circumstances we have a so-called reactive attitude where 
a human agent is seen as a member of a moral 
community. We are simply prone to these reactive 
attitudes, direct unreflected reactions, towards acts we 
judge as blame- or praiseworthy. In some cases this initial 
reaction is revoked and replaced by a so-called objective 
attitude, in which the agent is viewed in a more detached 
and objective way, because it is conceded that the agent 
did not act intentionally and is thus not worthy of praise 
or blame for that specific act. In other cases the agent is 
seen as external to the moral community and not a 
suitable target for praise or blame because it is not able to 
do anything intentionally (because it is unable to judge, 
reason, weigh consequences and so forth). Such an agent 
should therefore be approached solely with a so-called 
objective attitude, as something which can be understood 
and controlled, but which does not have proper intentions.  
These two attitudes, objective and reactive, are just facts 
of life, Strawson claims. It is part of our nature to display 
these attitudes, part of our social genome. He writes: “the 
existence of the general framework of attitudes itself is 
something we are given with the fact of human 
society" [Strawson, 2008, p. 25]. The fact that we are 
social animals make us attribute (or withhold, in the case 
where we take the objective attitude) blame or praise and 
thus responsibility long before any theoretical 
considerations about causal determinism or autonomy 
come into play. He has three arguments for this claim. !
First: the truth of determinism cannot structurally damage 
our approach to agents. For if determinism is true, it 
determines and thus excuses all acts and all agents. If we 
must excuse all acts and all agents we must accept that 
either all agents act unintentionally or all agents are 
morally incapacitated. Clearly we have acts that are 
intentionally malevolent and clearly we have agents that 
are morally capable, therefore the truth of determinism 
doesn't structurally undermine the applicability of 
reactive attitudes. !
Second: Strawson argues that, even if we can, on 
occasion, adopt an objective (detached) attitude it would 
be psychologically impossible for us to adopt it all of the 
time. Strawson: !
I am strongly inclined to think that it is, for us as we are, 
practically inconceivable. The human commitment to 
participation in ordinary inter-personal relationships is, I 
think, too thoroughgoing and deeply rooted for us to take 
seriously the thought that a general theoretical conviction 
might so change our world that, in it, there were no 
longer any such things as inter-personal relationships as 
we normally understand them; and being involved in 
inter-personal relationships as we normally understand 
them precisely is being exposed to the range of reactive 
attitudes and feelings that is in question. 
[Strawson, 2008, p. 12] !
Third: it might be argued that ignoring, on a practical 
level, the truth of determinism is not rational. Strawson 
argues that it is exactly the sense of `rational' that is at 
stake here: !
It is a question about what it would be rational to do if 
determinism were true, a question about the rational 
justification of ordinary inter-personal attitudes in 
general. […] And I shall reply [...] [that] we could choose 
rationally only in the light of an assessment of the gains 
and losses to human li fe, i ts enrichment or 
impoverishment; and the truth or falsity of a general 
thesis of determinism would not bear on the rationality of 
this choice[p.14]. [...] The rationality of making or 
refusing it would be determined by quite other 
considerations than the truth or falsity of the general 
theoretical doctrine in question. The latter would be 
simply irrelevant[p.20]. 
[Strawson, 2008, pp. 14{20] 
What is considered rational is not a matter of the truth or 
falsity of some proposition, but a matter of the "gains and 
losses to human life". It need not be argued that rejecting 
any notion of responsibility would be a great loss to 
human life and that holding on to such a notion would be 
a great gain. Personal reactive attitudes are thus 
justifiably used in human society. !
Strawson goes on to argue that moral reactive attitudes, 
which are “generalized or vicarious analogues", rest on 
exactly the same arguments. Just as “the very great 
importance that we attach to the attitudes and intentions 
towards us of other human beings, and the great extent to 
which our personal feelings and reactions depend upon, 
or involve, our beliefs about these attitudes and 
intentions" [Strawson, 2008, p. 5] compels us to accept 
the validity of our personal reactive attitudes, so the 
commitment to moral reactive attitudes validates those 
attitudes. It is inconceivable, argues Strawson, that we 
abandon our ascriptions of blame or praise, of moral 
responsibility, in the face of mere theoretical 
considerations. !
STRAWSON APPLIED TO AI 
Freedom and Resentment is introduced as a source in 
which the problems that the possible truth of determinism 
holds for human responsibility are confronted by a 
bottom-up approach. The fact that we do, and rationally 
so, attribute responsibility to human agents renders purely 
theoretical claims about determinism and thus autonomy 
moot. If the fact that we cannot know whether human 
agency satisfies AOC or AC is made irrelevant for the 
attribution of responsibility to humans, then it might be 
the case that the fact that we cannot know whether AI 
satisfy AOC and AC is also irrelevant for the attribution 
of responsibility to AI. If human responsibility needs no 
external (independent) conditions, why should AI need it? 
The questions surrounding responsibility and AI in 
Strawson’s analysis would thus be whether an AI is a 
proper target for blame or praise (using the reactive 
attitude), or one of those agents which are to be 
approached with a objective attitude. Interestingly, the 
question is not whether an AI is intentional, conscious, 
autonomous, etc., but whether an AI can, would or should 
be treated as if it were one of us, a participant of our 
moral community. This is a markedly different question 
than the questions that form the contemporary main 
discussions on AI and responsibility. They almost 
invariably turn on such intractable properties or entities 
human acts are supposed to possess. Searching for these 
properties in order to be able to know when to attribute 
responsibility to AI is searching for external conditions all 
over again. Strawson’s take bypasses these questions and 
aims at the practical side. Would we identify an AI as a 
member of our moral community? This question can be 
seen as the question whether an AI would pass a 
generalized Turing test, not aimed at conversational 
intelligence, but aimed at whatever it takes to be accepted 
as a member of our moral community.  
Membership moral community  
Strawson admits in Freedom and Resentment that his 
dichotomy of reactive and objective attitudes is rough and 
many intermediate situations could and should be 
acknowledged. For example, there is no exact moment at 
which a child turns from innocent angel to fully-edged 
moral agent. A thorough sociological or psychological 
analysis to determine when exactly a community accepts 
an agent as one of its own is beyond the scope of this 
essay but I will make six preliminary observations that 
might guide such an analysis: 
Observation 1 
Humans have the ability to discern morally capable 
agents from morally incapable agents. This ability is not 
flawless or all-powerful because we sometimes make 
mistakes when attributing or withholding responsibility, 
e.g. when we wonder whether to assign moral capability 
to criminals. We also encounter situations in which we 
cannot really tell the difference, e.g. with children. !
Observation 2  
M o r a l c a p a b i l i t y o r b l a m e w o r t h i n e s s a n d 
praiseworthiness is not an all-or-nothing affair. Human 
agents differ in their (cognitive, social, etc.) abilities and 
whether they are blamed or not depends for a great deal 
on those abilities. For example, if I (not a physician) 
make a horrible medical mistake while trying to save a 
dying man I will not be blamed for I do not have the 
know-how needed to discern between the right treatment 
and the mistake. In this case, as in others, I would even be 
obliged not to help in a medical way. A trained doctor will 
be blamed for doing exactly the same thing I did, because 
he has the know-how and isn't expected to make such a 
horrible medical mistake. !
Observation 3 
If an agent is blamed or not depends partially on the 
judgement of the capacities of that agent. It is the 
(informed) judgement of the community which 
determines whether the agent is to be blamed or not. E.g. 
it is said that the agent `should have known better' even 
if he did not know better. !
Observation 4  
Humans have a remarkable trust in the moral capabilities 
and thus the applicability of responsibility to anything 
that does not in the slightest resemble a human. Most 
people have blamed their computer, their car, the weather, 
etc. for bringing about all kinds of misery. Apparently 
sometimes (although most of the time only for a moment) 
we believe these machines and phenomena cause the 
misery, have the opportunity to do something else and act 
intentionally (perhaps even cruelly?).  !
Observation 5  
The more complex or inscrutable the agent we encounter 
is, the easier it is for us to assign the agent all sorts of 
intentions. When my ballpoint fails it is not easy to see 
how I could blame it, but when something as complex as 
my notebook fails I sometimes blame it for failing. When 
a severely mentally handicapped human injures me I am 
hard pressed to feel resentment, but when an intelligent 
person hurts me I will be angry with him. !
Observation 6  
We excuse agents that we do not consider to be full 
members of our moral community. Depending on their 
level of development in our moral community we assign 
or withhold judgement, as in the case of a stranger that is 
not accustomed to our ways, as in the case of a child that 
does not yet know the subtle rules we live by. !
AI as members of our moral community  
What requirements of inclusion in our moral community 
emerge from these observations? It must be noted that we 
are once again looking at conditions, this time the 
psychological conditions for judging an agent as an 
individual on a par with his judges. 
Taking these observations it seems membership of our 
moral community, and thus being an accepted target for 
reactive attitudes, hinges not on being human or even 
being humanoid, but on the ascription of being able to 
learn from blame or praise. As long as the actor is seen as 
a complex agent, with intentions, reason-receptiveness 
and the ability to adjust its behavior when prompted we 
are able to allow anyone or anything a trial membership, 
giving it time to develop into a full membership.  !
Notwithstanding the limits of this paper it can be stated 
that AI could be held to be responsible, just as humans are 
held to be responsible, if they are accepted as members of 
our moral community. What it takes to be granted this 
membership is a question for future sociological/
psychological research. !
CONCLUSION  
When trying to figure out which act is a suitable target for 
assigning responsibility IC theories, independent 
condition theories, are brought to the fore. Applying these 
to human agents demands applying the concepts of inten-
tionality and autonomy, concepts which are thought of as 
not applicable to AI. Therefore AI are thought of as 
unsuitable targets for assigning responsibility. The 
concepts used on human acts are troublesome, however. 
From a philosophical perspective they are — at least at 
the moment — impossible to define and thus impossible 
to predicate. The question whether we can understand 
responsibility at all, let alone in AI, comes up. IC theories 
make demands we cannot meet, so where can we turn? 
Peter Strawson tries out a new turn in thinking about 
responsibility by placing the determining force in the 
moral community. It is the practice of everyday life that 
determines responsibility.  
It turned out that, although several preliminary 
observations could be made, the answer to this question 
can only be given by psychological research. Such 
research could be one of the main challenges in robotics.  !!!!!!!!
How can we adjust to AI? AI are entering our everyday 
life, and are not simple machines we can put next to our 
hammer, lawnmower and dishwasher. As AI come ever 
closer to cognitive and functional equivalency with 
humans we will have to reorganize the admissions 
committee of our moral community. 
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